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Abstract
High quality information is vital for a good communication between
the corporation and the investing community. Companies can commu-
nicate their information by means of disclosure and recognition. Disclo-
sure is the process of providing information in the financial statements
through footnotes, management and discussion analysis, supplemen-
tary schedules, or other means. Recognition is the process of incorpo-
rating an item in the balance sheet or income statement (IAS Board
Framework). Although investors as well as financial analysts could
make better investment decisions when having more insights into this
interaction, little research has been done about the interaction between
disclosure quality and recognition practices. Therefore, this paper con-
centrates on the following research questions: do disclosure quality and
recognition practices complement each other, and are high-quality dis-
closures an assurance for less earnings smoothing? More specifically,
we examine whether the ratings of the Belgian Association of Financial
Analysts (i.e. a proxy for disclosure quality of Belgian listed firms) are
(1) related to the level of discretionary accruals, a measure of earn-
ings smoothing, and (2) related to the earnings-return association, a
measure of earnings timeliness.
1 Introduction
Disclosure is the process of providing information through the means of foot-
notes in financial statements, annual reports, management and discussion
analysis, supplementary schedules etc. Recognition on the other hand is
the formal process of incorporating an item in the balance sheet or income
statement (IAS Board Framework). Disclosure and recognition together
form the information available for shareholders of a firm, and is of great
importance. Based on this information, analysts and investors make lots
of decisions. Although this information is intensively used, little is known
about its coherence. One of the questions that raises, is ”Does a high dis-
closure quality also involve a high recognition quality?”. With high quality
recognition proper legal recognition practices are meant. In other words: ”Is
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there a correlation between high disclosure quality and the way recognition
takes place?” ”Does a high disclosure quality give a guarantee for a right
process of recognition?” One may wonder why this process of recognition is
so important. It is because recognition is frequently used as a tool of earn-
ings management. The purpose of this paper is to link disclosure quality,
earnings smoothing and earnings’ timeliness for Belgian firms. The outlines
of the paper are inspired by Shaw (2003) who did previous research on this
topic on US-data.
This article contributes to the literature concerning earnings smoothing and
timeliness in relation to disclosure quality. Evidence was found for a rela-
tion between disclosure quality and earnings management (higher disclosure
quality, more earnings management). Including a news variable did however
not reveal a relation between disclosure quality and income smoothing, al-
though the signs of the coefficients and one significance in specific pointed
in a direction of higher disclosure quality firms smoothing income more. For
a relation between disclosure quality and earnings’ timeliness on the other
hand, evidence was found. Where a hypothesis of a negative relation be-
tween disclosure quality and asymmetric timeliness was formulated, proof
of the opposite was found.
2 Descriptions of our Variables
2.1 Determinants of Disclosure Quality
To investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and income smooth-
ing, it is important to make sure to include all variables that can influence
the dependent variable. In this paper, disclosure quality will be taken as
dependent variable in the disclosure quality - income smoothing relation.
For the inclusion of control variables of disclosure quality, we used existing
research in this field. Lang and Lundholm (1993) delivered some important
contribution hereto. They found a significant relationship between disclo-
sure quality and firm size, firm performance, the correlation between the
previous two and the fact if there were issues in the near future. Healy et
al. (1999) found the same conclusion concerning the positive relationship
between disclosure quality and issuance.
2.2 Earnings Management Models
Measuring earnings management is a difficult task. Different models are pre-
sented in the literature, which mostly try to detect earnings management by
means of accruals. The difficulty here is to separate the accruals into dis-
cretionary (i.e. managed) and non-discretionary (i.e.normal, unmanaged)
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accruals. The cross-sectional version of the standard Jones model (Jones,
1991) and of the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) are most fre-
quently used for this separation.
The standard Jones model was originally in a time-series version and in a
cross-sectional version. Guay et al. (1996), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kang
and Shivaramakrishnan (1995) deal with the evaluation of the time-series
version. However, Subramanyam (1996) as well as Bartov et al. (2001) pre-
ferred the cross-sectional version, as they find it performs better in detecting
earnings management than the time-series counterpart. Also other authors
preferred the cross-sectional version: DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), DeFond
and Subramanyam (1997), Becker et al.(1998). Peasnell et al. (2000) did
some evaluation research of this cross-sectional version.
Another point of differentiation, aside from the cross-sectional versus the
time-series version, is the composition of the accruals. The original Jones
model uses total accruals. Teoh et al. (1998) and DeFond and Jiambalvo
(1994) focus on the working capital part of total accruals (called ’current
accruals’ by Teoh et al.(1998)). Beneish (1998) and Young (1999) consider
these to be potentially better models. At last, Peasnell et al. (2000) in-
troduced a new procedure of detecting earnings management: the margin
model.
3 Hypothesis development
The main question of this paper is whether high disclosure quality means
lower income smoothing. Income smoothing is a particular form of earnings
management. We will first try to detect a relationship between earnings
management and disclosure quality. Then in a next step we’ll search for
income smoothing.
One can think of the disclosure quality - earnings management relationship
in different ways. One of them is to see firms with a high quality of disclo-
sure as firms with nothing to hide, who lay their cards on the table, and
therefore will probably not manage earnings. This will be the point of view
in our first hypothesis. We predict high disclosure quality firms to manage
earnings less than low quality firms. As a proxy for earnings management,
discretionary accruals will be used.
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a high disclosure quality will engage less discre-
tionary accruals than low disclosure quality firms.
In other words, we believe high disclosure quality firms to be more con-
servative. In the next step, we will take one particular form of earnings
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management into consideration, namely income smoothing. DeFond and
Park (1997) provided evidence that firms with good current performance
and poor expected future performance use income-decreasing discretional
accruals, and income-increasing accruals if the situation is the other way
around. By this means firms smooth their income. This finding will be
the basis for testing the relationship between disclosure quality and income
smoothing. Concretely, disclosure quality ratings will be tested on their
relationship with discretionary accruals, with good or bad news taken into
account. Again we will take the point of view where firms with a higher
quality of disclosure engage less in income smoothing. This leads to:
Hypothesis 2: In good news years, there will be a positive relation between
disclosure quality and discretionary accruals (the lower the quality, the more
income-decreasing accruals). In bad news years, there will be a negative re-
lation between disclosure quality and discretionary accruals (the lower the
quality, the more income-increasing accruals)
Another topic that we investigate, is timeliness. The reasoning for this is to
find in the relationship between timeliness and conservatism. Up till now we
based our hypotheses on the assumption that high disclosure quality goes
along with conservatism. Already in 1924 Bliss described conservatism as
’Anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses’. Nowadays lots of definitions
of conservatism have been written down, but in essence it all boils down
to this one early description. Conservatism expresses itself in many ways,
one of which is through asymmetric timeliness (Basu 1997). Basu found
evidence that the timeliness of earnings recognition was much higher for
bad news company-years than for good news company-years, where news is
measured by stock returns. In following Shaw (2003) we investigate whether
this asymmetry in timeliness between good and bad news years relates to
disclosure quality in any way. Timeliness will be measured by the earnings-
return relation, as did Beaver et al. (1980), Basu (1997) and Shaw (2003).
Shaw (2003) found evidence that this asymmetry was only true for the low
quality firms. Also Lang and Lundholm (1993) found a negative relation
between disclosure quality and the earnings - return relation. To build up a
logical set of hypotheses however, we continue to assume more conservatism,
and hence more asymmetry, within the high disclosure quality group. We
just keep in mind the opposite outcomes of other authors to compare with
later on.
Hypothesis 3: There will be a greater difference in the earnings-return rela-
tion between good and bad news years with firms of a high disclosure quality
than with firms of a low disclosure quality.
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4 Research Design
4.1 Data Selection
First of all, we needed a proxy for disclosure quality. We used analysts’
disclosure quality ratings for this. Each year the Belgian Association of Fi-
nancial Analysts awards the best financial information disclosure out of a
selected sample of Belgian listed firms. This sample is quite small, approxi-
mately 40 firms a year. While we needed a time series of firms, we selected
eventually 38 firms with enough data available over 6 years (1997 through
2002). No financial banks were included. After checking for outliers, this
became 37. This gives us a sample of 222 firm-years. Not all outliers re-
sulted in dropping the entire case. Some other outliers were just dropped
in that specific variable, creating a missing value. This was considered the
best option in the light of the relative small sample size.
The Bel-first CD-rom will be the data source for this analysis, which provides
data on Belgian and Luxembourg firms. The Bel-first contains general and
financial data provided by Bureau Van Dijk, the Euro-DB and the register
of National Commerce amongst others.
4.2 Model Specification
4.2.1 Discretionary Accruals
For measuring earnings management, and in a later phase income smoothing,
we need a proxy for earnings management. For this we use the cross-sectional
version of the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995). This looks like
follows:
ACCRi,t
TAi,t−1
=
α
TAi,t−1
+ β(
∆REVi,t −∆RECi,t
TAi,t−1
) + γ
PPEi,t
TAi,t−1
+ ²i,t
Although, there are some supplementary modifications we made. First of
all, Teoh et al. (1998) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) were followed in
using only the current accruals, and not the total accruals as in the original
(and modified) model. This also leads to dropping the Plant,Property and
Equipment variable. Also a second suggestion, from Peasnell et al. (2000),
was included. We agree namely in the benefit of not scaling the constant
and hereby not forcing it through the origin. A last modification is also of
econometric thought: in the modified model, one has been trying to take
into account the effect of managed credit sales. This has been done by
subtracting the change in receivables from the change in revenues. This
difference is seen as a new variable. While we only have a relative small
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sample size, we believe that it is a pity to loose information about the
separated estimators. So the difference wasn’t treated as one variable with
one estimator, but as two variables, with of course two estimators. All these
modifications together lead to
C.ACC.i,t
TAi,t−1
= α+ β
∆REVi,t
TAi,t−1
+ γ
∆RECi,t
TAi,t−1
+ ²i,t (1)
where C.ACC.i,t is Current Accruals of firm i in year t, TAi,t−1 is Total
Assets of firm i in the beginning of year t, ∆REVi,t is firm i ’s revenues in
year t minus i ’s revenues in year t-1 and the same for ∆RECi,t which is
the change in firm i ’s receivables between year t and t-1. For γ we expect a
negative sign.
Current accruals are calculated as follows: C.ACC.i,t = (∆CurrentAssetsi,t−
∆Cashi,t)− (∆CurrentLiabilitiesi,t −∆CurrentMaturitiesofLongTerm
Debtsi,t). This model was estimated separately for each 3-digit industry
attendant in the 37 firms and for each of the six years. The mean number of
firms per industry per year was 258. The estimators found were then used
for calculating the fitted values of the current accruals for the 37 firms over
the six years. These fitted values were subtracted from the actual values,
resulting in the error terms, our variable ”Discretionary Accruals”. This
new variable, abbreviated as DAC, is our proxy for earnings management.
4.2.2 Disclosure Quality - Income Smoothing
In a first step, we try to detect a relationship between disclosure quality
(DQ) and discretionary accruals, our proxy for earnings management. For
estimating a model which relates these two variables, it is important to
include some control variables. For this inclusion we look at other research
and decide to include size, return, issue and the correlation between earnings
and return.
Firm size will be measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Size)
at the beginning of the year, and firm performance by returns (Ret). For
the correlation between earnings and return we use the correlation between
net income before extraordinary items (as earnings) and return over the
available years (CRet). Extreme values of net income before extraordinary
items are deleted, as Dechow et al. (1995) reported the negative effect on
the estimators of these extreme values. Issues will be taken into account as
a dummy variable, equaling one when a firm issues in that or one of the two
following years, and zero otherwise (Issue). Together this gives the model:
DQi,t = α0+α1DACi,t+α2Sizei,t+α3Reti,t+α4CReti,t+α5Issuei,t+ ²i,t
(2)
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This model will be estimated for testing the first hypothesis.
In the end, we want to detect a relationship between disclosure quality
and income smoothing, and not earnings management. So we have to alter
equation (2). What is typically about income smoothing, is the opposite
use of discretional accruals during good news years relative to bad news
years. Income smoothing involves income-decreasing accruals during good
news years, and income-increasing accruals during bad news years. Hence
we have to comprise a variable that takes into account this news variation.
In following Shaw (2003) amongst others we do this by the use of a dummy
variable (News) which equals 1 in a year of bad news (stock returns are
smaller than zero) and zero otherwise. This gives:
DQi,t = β0 + β1DACi,t + β2Newsi,t + β3(Newsi,t ∗ DACi,t) +
β4Sizei,t + β5Reti,t + β6CReti,t + β7Issuei,t + ²i,t (3)
The relationship between disclosure quality and discretionary accruals dur-
ing good news years is captured in β1. The difference of the relation between
good and bad news years is comprised in β3. The sum of both represents the
relation between quality and accruals during bad news years. This model
will be estimated using panel data over the years 1997 through 2002 for the
37 firms of our sample.
4.2.3 Disclosure Quality - Earnings Timeliness
Eventually we want to link disclosure quality to timeliness, as stated before.
The reasoning for this was the association between conservatism and timeli-
ness. As Basu (1997) stated: ”More timeliness implies that earnings reflect
more of the variance in returns contemporaneously rather than spreading it
out over current and future periods.” This phenomenon is expected to be
higher with high disclosure quality firms than with low disclosure quality
firms, according to hypothesis 3.
Timeliness will be measured by the earnings - return relation. Earnings, net
income before extraordinary items, are scaled by lagged assets. Following
Beaver et al. (1980), Basu (1997) and Shaw (2003) we estimate a ”reverse
regression” of earnings on returns, with dummy variables presenting disclo-
sure quality and news type. The dummy of disclosure quality (DQd) equals
1 in case of a higher disclosure quality rating than the median of the sample,
zero otherwise. The dummy of news stays the same as before: 1 in case of
bad news, 0 otherwise.
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Earningsi,t = γ0 + γ1Reti,t + γ2DQdi,t + γ3Newsi,t +
γ4(Reti,t ∗ Newsi,t) + γ5(Reti,t ∗ DQdi,t) +
γ6(Reti,t ∗ Newsi,t ∗ DQdi,t) + ²i,t (4)
The earnings - return relation for low quality firms during good news years
is captured in γ1 and during bad news years in the sum of γ1 and γ4. The
timeliness for high disclosure quality firms during good news years is pre-
sented by γ1 + γ5 and during bad news years by the sum of γ1, γ4 and γ5.
Also this model will be estimated using panel data of the 37 firms over the
six years.
5 Research Findings
5.1 First hypothesis of lower earnings management for higher
disclosure quality firms
For testing the first hypothesis, we estimated equation (2). An acceptance of
the hypothesis would result from a significant negative estimator of α1. The
higher the disclosure quality, the lower the discretionary accruals. We esti-
mated the model with an Iterated General Least Square procedure (IGLS),
taking care of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of first order. This of
course was done after finding results of presence of these two phenomenons.
Table 1 reports the results of estimating equation (2).
We see that there is a significant relationship between disclosure quality
and discretionary accruals on a .04-level, after controlling for other deter-
minants of disclosure quality. Only this relation is not what we expected
it to be. This is a positive relation, indicating that high disclosure quality
firms use relatively more income-increasing accruals than low quality firms.
In other words: the higher the quality of disclosure, the lower the con-
servatism in recognition. Hereby we reject the first hypothesis. But still it
stays interesting to find out if this relationship lasts the same under different
circumstances regarding news type.
5.2 Second hypothesis of lower income smoothing for higher
disclosure quality firms
This second hypothesis is tested by estimating equation (3). Tests for
heteroscedasticity (White) and for first-order autocorrelation (Wooldridge)
were exercised. They indicated again the same problems as for the first
8
Table 1: Disclosure Quality - Earnings Management
DQi,t = α0 + α1DACi,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Reti,t + α4CReti,t + α5Issuei,t + ²i,t
Intercept DAC Size Ret CRet Issue
Coefficient -3.8184 .2251 .2769 .0008 .1191 .2743
p-value .000 .039 .000 .068 .050 .001
DQi,t = the disclosure quality rating of firm i in year t.
DACi,t = the discretionary component of total accruals of firm i in year t. These are
equal to the error terms of the following model:
C.ACC.i,t
TAi,t−1
= α+ β
∆REVi,t
TAi,t−1
+ γ
∆RECi,t
TAi,t−1
+ ²i,t
This model was OLS estimated for all Belgian firms by year and by 3-digit NACE-codes,
where C.ACC.i,t stands for Current Accruals of firm i in year t, TAi,t−1 for Total Assets
of firm i in the beginning of year t, ∆REVi,t for firm i ’s revenues in year t minus i ’s
revenues in year t-1 and the same for ∆RECi,t which is the change in firm i ’s
receivables between year t and t-1.
Sizei,t = the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i at the beginning of year t
Reti,t = stock returns for firm i in year t, a proxy of performance
CReti,t = the correlation between earnings and return for firm i over all the available
years before and including year t
Issuei,t = a dummy variable, equaling one when a firm issues in that or one of the two
following years, and zero otherwise
1The model was estimated using iterated generalized least squares. The results reported
include the estimated coefficients of the variables and the p-values. Number of
observations equals 155
regression, so we estimated also this model with IGLS controlling for het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation first-order. According to the second hy-
pothesis we expect a positive relation between disclosure quality and accruals
during good news years. So the estimator of β1 is expected to be positive. In
the bad news years however, we expect this relation to be negative (the lower
the quality, the higher the (income-increasing) accruals). This would be the
case with a significant negative (β1 + β3). The results of the estimation are
to be found in Table 2.
As we can see, the opposite of our hypothesis is true in good news years.
In good news years, there is a negative relation between disclosure quality
and discretionary accruals of -.6851 with a significance level of .05. This
means that during good news years, firms with a higher disclosure quality
tend to decrease their income more than lower quality firms. This is the
opposite of what we found in the first place, under hypothesis 1. There
we found evidence that high disclosure quality firms manage earnings more
upward in relation to low disclosure quality firms. So apparently this situa-
9
Table 2: Disclosure Quality - Income Smoothing
equation (3)
Intercept DAC News News * DAC Size Ret CRet Issue
Coefficient -4.6410 -.6851 -.0296 .4266 .3374 .0015 .1080 .1123
p-value .000 .049 .724 .248 .000 .061 .102 .214
DQi,t = the disclosure quality rating of firm i in year t.
DACi,t = the discretionary component of total accruals of firm i in year t. These are
equal to the error terms of the following model:
C.ACC.i,t
TAi,t−1
= α+ β
∆REVi,t
TAi,t−1
+ γ
∆RECi,t
TAi,t−1
+ ²i,t
This model was OLS estimated for all Belgian firms by year and by 3-digit NACE-codes,
where C.ACC.i,t stands for Current Accruals of firm i in year t, TAi,t−1 for Total Assets
of firm i in the beginning of year t, ∆REVi,t for firm i ’s revenues in year t minus i ’s
revenues in year t-1 and the same for ∆RECi,t which is the change in firm i ’s
receivables between year t and t-1.
Newsi,t = equals 1 in a year of bad news (stock returns are smaller than zero) and zero
otherwise
Sizei,t = the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i at the beginning of year t
Reti,t = stock returns for firm i in year t, a proxy of performance
CReti,t = the correlation between earnings and return for firm i over all the available
years before and including year t
Issuei,t = a dummy variable, equaling one when a firm issues in that or one of the two
following years, and zero otherwise
2The model was estimated using iterated generalized least squares. The results reported
include the estimated coefficients of the variables and the p-values. Number of
observations equals 128
tion isn’t always the case. In good news years, it appears that they manage
earnings more downward. Under the assumption of a general tendency of
income smoothing3, there is a positive relation between disclosure quality
and income smoothing during good news years. This significant finding, of
high disclosure quality firms manipulating income more than low disclosure
quality firms, is not present in bad news years. In bad news years, the co-
efficient capturing the relation between disclosure quality and discretionary
accruals is −.02528 (-.6851 + .4266) and not significant. Although this is
not significant, maybe the positive change of good news years to bad news
years (.4266) can indicate an overall income smoothing, but just not always
dependent of disclosure quality.
So up till now, we found evidence of high disclosure quality firms manip-
ulating income more upwards in general, but more downwards in times of
3see Lybaert et al. ”Provisions, a tool for earnings management?”
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good news. This higher manipulation isn’t found in bad news years. So
we have no evidence of income smoothing related to disclosure quality, and
hereby reject hypothesis 2. If there was any result significant, it was in the
opposite direction we expected it to be, namely that high disclosure firms
manipulate more than low disclosure firms.
Although there was no relation between disclosure quality and income smooth-
ing, this doesn’t mean that our last hypothesis of asymmetric timeliness
related to disclosure quality has no chance to stand. We found evidence of
high disclosure quality firms to be less conservative and to decrease income
more during good news years than low quality firms do, so maybe the op-
posite of the third hypothesis is to be found. This would be a confirmation
of Lang and Lundholm’s and Shaw’s findings.
5.3 Third hypothesis of higher asymmetric timeliness for
high disclosure quality firms
The link between timeliness and disclosure quality is investigated using equa-
tion (4). First we did two explorative estimations, like Shaw (2003). This
was to see whether our data confirms the findings of Lang and Lundholm
(1993) and Basu (1997). The (untabulated) results of the regression of Earn-
ings on Ret, DQd and Ret*DQd confirmed in a way the findings of Lang
and Lundholm (1993). We namely found a negative relation between the
earnings - return relation and disclosure quality, but this was only slightly
significant. The coefficient of γ5 was significant on a .10 level. Taken our
relatively small sample size into account, this is quite reasonable we think.
A regression of Earnings on Ret, News and Ret*News also confirms Basu’s
findings of a higher earnings - return relation in times of bad news than in
times of good news. The estimator of γ4 was positive and significant on a
.05 level.
The results of the estimation of the full model (equation (4)) are reported
in Tabel 3. For the estimation the same tests are used as for the estimation
of equation (2) and (3).
For interpretation of these results, some calculations have to be made. The
relation between disclosure quality and earnings’ timeliness, in different sit-
uations is expressed by:
Coefficient p-value
Low DQ/Good News γ1 0.0000929 .218
Low DQ/Bad News γ1 + γ4 0.0003795 .008
High DQ/Good News γ1 + γ5 0.0000765 .017
High DQ/Bad News γ1 + γ4 + γ5 0.0000853 .471
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Table 3: Disclosure Quality - Earnings’ Timeliness
equation (4)
Interc. Ret DQd News
Coefficient .0352 .0000929 -.0046526 .0083325
p-value .000 .218 .281 .019
Ret*News Ret*DQd Ret*News*DQd
Coefficient .0002866 -.0000164 -.0002778
p-value .094 .823 .175
Earningsi,t = Net income before extraordinary items, scaled by lagged assets, of firm i
in year t.
Reti,t = stock returns for firm i in year t, a proxy of performance
DQdi,t = the disclosure quality dummy of firm i in year t, equaling 1 if the rating is
above the sample median, zero otherwise.
Newsi,t = equals 1 in a year of bad news (stock returns are smaller than zero) and zero
otherwise
4The model was estimated using iterated generalized least squares. The results reported
include the estimated coefficients of the variables and the p-values. Number of
observations equals 168
Figure 1: Histogram of timeliness in relation to disclosure quality and news
type
For a better comparison with the results of Shaw, we also provided a his-
togram of these coefficients. We generally become the same results.
In good news years, disclosure quality doesn’t have an impact on a firms’
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timeliness. The earnings - return relation coefficient for high disclosure
quality firms equals .0000765 and is significant (.02). But this coefficient
isn’t significantly different from the coefficient of low quality firms in good
news years (.0000929). In bad news years however, the earnings - return
relation of low disclosure quality firms is almost 4,5 times as high as with
high disclosure quality firms (.0003795 vs. .0000853). This difference has a
p-value of .017. So in bad news years, firms with a high disclosure quality
postpone recognition of this bad news, while low disclosure quality firms
don’t.
If we watch the histogram, the sensitivity of bad news which leads to asym-
metric timeliness, found by Basu and also in our sample, is apparently only
to be brought back to the low disclosure quality firms. Although timeliness
is 4 times as high in times of bad news as in times of good news (.0003795
vs. .0000929), this difference is not significant.
So the main finding here is that high disclosure quality firms don’t show
asymmetry in earnings’ timeliness, which normally goes along with conser-
vatism, but that low disclosure quality firms do show this asymmetry. This
leads to rejecting hypothesis 3 and to confirming the findings of Lang and
Lundholm (1993) and Shaw (2003).
6 Conclusions and Limitations
In this paper the relations between disclosure quality and earnings manage-
ment and disclosure quality and income smoothing among Belgian firms are
investigated. Later on also the relation between disclosure quality and earn-
ings’ timeliness was investigated. In general, evidence was found for high
disclosure quality firms to manage earnings more. But when we introduced
a variable containing news type into the model, no evidence of a relation
between disclosure quality and income smoothing was found. There was
however proof that during good news years, high quality firms engage more
in income-decreasing accruals than low disclosure quality firms do.
For a relationship between disclosure quality and earnings’ timeliness, we did
find significant evidence. It seems that firms of low disclosure quality show
asymmetry in their recognition process (timeliness), and that firms of high
disclosure quality don’t. So where low disclosure quality firms immediately
recognize bad news in their financial reports, high disclosure quality firms
postpone this. Probably they trade rapid recognition for higher quality
in disclosure, and so take the time to prepare the shareholders. This is
consistent with Shaw’s and Lang and Lundholm’s findings (2003 and 1993).
As in any other research, there are some limitations to the research done
here. First of all, the search for a relationship between disclosure qual-
ity and earnings management/income smoothing is as good or as bad as
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the model used for determining earnings management. The cross-sectional
modified Jones model, with some extra alterations, was used here. Using
other procedures for detecting earnings management and comparing results
with these results would be interesting. In this paper the model is used to
establish the discretionary component of 37 firm’s accruals. This can be
subjected to further research in the expansion of the sample by rating more
firms’ disclosure quality. Here of course plays the time component a major
role. Our 37 firms could have caused a selection bias, since these were all
firms, rated by the Belgian Association of Financial Analysts.
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